Is tort law a practice of corrective justice?

Abstract

In this paper, I will explore whether the view by Jules Coleman that tort law is a practice of corrective justice can be considered an appropriate explanation of the nature of tort law. I will argue that this may be possible, if some modifications are made to Coleman’s account. This article will proceed in three parts. In part one, I will briefly introduce Coleman’s view. I will also show that the corrective justice thesis is ambiguous, and I will suggest a disambiguation of it into three different claims: the parochial, conceptual and normative. Finally, I will explain how the conceptual claim can be understood as a basis for a general theory of the nature of torts. In part two, I will suggest several modifications to Coleman’s account of the normative structure of tort law and the appropriate methodology to account for it. I argue that, as a conceptual claim, thecorrective justice thesis is, at the same time, underand over-inclusive, and suggests a way out from these problems. Finally, in part three, I will propose an account of the foundational justification for tort law. It is based on the idea that the reason for creating and maintaining a social practice of tort law is compensating for the deficiencies of moral responsibility with regard to solving the problem of redressing the harm caused by human agency